|

 
|
| | Name : | Rhoda Silver | Organization : | N/A | Post Date : | 9/30/2005 |
| Section : | 6.8 | Page no. : | | Line no.: | | Comment : | Dear EAC Commissioners:
I believe it is within your interpretive powers as the EAC to define the
document described as the mandatory paper audit trail in Section 301(a)2
of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).
No legitimate audit can be carried out unless that audit uses a
contemporaneous independent indelible record of the voter’s intent. No
electronic record -- unseen by the voter and subject to programming error,
equipment malfunction or even malicious tampering -- can reasonably meet
that standard, nor any reprint (unverified by the voter) of that same
electronic record. Thus it will vastly improve the legitimacy of the
nation’s elections if the EAC clarifies that the manual paper audit trail
shall be voter-verified.
On January 18, 2005 Professor Ron Rivest introduced a resolution (#13-05)
to require voter-verified paper trails at the TGDC meeting. That
resolution was voted down, by members of the committee who know less about
computer security than the person who introduced the measure.
I urge the EAC to reinstate the recommendation in resolution #13-05 and
require the essential safeguard of voter-verified paper records.
I further urge you:
-to reject wireless capability of any kind in our voting systems;
-to clarify terms used for VVPAT such that standards for voter-verified
paper ballots (e.g. optical scan) are not confused with standards for
voter-verified paper audit trails (e.g. printers on DREs);
-to adopt Resolution #17-05 for more stringent testing of voting systems
for security; and
-to allow interoperability so that voting systems from different vendors
are able to work together more freely, saving taxpayer resources.
Thank you for your consideration.
I monitored the verifed voting bill hearings in North Carolina this past
winter as the committee listened to testimony prior to drawing up a bill.
then I followed the various versions before a final bill and a vote were
taken.
After hearing all the testimony I am firmly convinced that a voter
verified paper ballot that can be recounted should the machine fail, is
central to honest elections. I also believe that code that is not open to
inspection by a representative of the state
in any DRE machine is more likely to be subject to manipulation and
dishonest practice. If you want honest elections you will not allow
private vendors to control the processes. | |
|
|