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| | Name : | Warren Smith | Organization : | N/A | Post Date : | 9/30/2005 |
| Comment : | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS:
One of the hopes for the future of voting is to employ "cryptographic
protocols" which
enable certain mathematical guarantees about vote privacy and election
correctness to be made.
These schemes are based on "zero knowledge proof & verification
protocols."
They offer the potential for an immense increase in election validity and
fraud prevention
far above that ever previously achieved. The guidelines leave the entire
subject unaddressed.
I suggest formulating at least a definition of what such a crypto-secure
voting system IS,
and then offering to allow more powerful computers in voting machines
satisfying that definition.
The definition should involve votes being
*private: a voter who wishes to keep his vote anonymous and secret
should be able to do so
(with mathematical certainty under cryptographic assumptions). Note:
this means
secret even from the machine which itself receives that vote (it
receives it only
in encrypted form).
*valid: zero-knowledge proofs must be produced that the vote is valid
*zero-knowledge proofs must be output by the voting system that only
pre-registered voters voted and
no double votes were used
*the correct election result must be produced, with zero-knowledge proof
of correctness | |
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