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| | Name : | Jordi Puiggali | Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting | Post Date : | 9/9/2005 |
| Section : | A1D | Page no. : | | Line no.: | | Comment : | [Volume I, Appendix D]
The definition of direct IDV systems should include all those systems that allow voters to directly
verify the correctness of their votes using a record that represents exactly their votes. This record
(e.g., paper, an electronic image, an audio representation) must be generated by a device
independent from the voting terminal and must be securely stored in this independent device. On
the other hand, indirect IDV systems could be defined as those systems in which voters need to
use an indirect method (such as a voting receipt without the exact representation of the vote) to
verify that their votes have been properly recorded.
Based on our proposed definition, VVPAT systems, independent module systems (described in
Exhibit B), cryptographic systems without receipt and split process IDV systems would be
considered direct IDV systems. On the other hand, receipt-based cryptographic systems and
witness systems would be considered indirect verification systems.
Therefore, we suggest to split this section in two subsections: VVPAT IDV systems and Direct
Electronic IDV systems. This latter subsection would include any system that allows a direct
verification with voter’s sense through an independent electronic module. | |
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