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| | Name : | Jordi Puiggali | Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting | Post Date : | 9/9/2005 |
| Section : | A1D | Page no. : | | Line no.: | | Comment : | [Volume I, Appendix D]
Receipt-based systems operate as follows (the description is identical to the one in the Guidelines
with the exception of a change in point 2):
1. A voter uses a voting station such as a DRE to make ballot choices.
2. The voting system (DRE or independent module) issues a paper receipt to the voter that
contains information that permits the voter to verify that the choices were recorded
correctly. The information does not permit the voter to reveal his or her choices.
3. The voter may have the option to check that his or her ballot choices were included in the
election count, e.g., by checking a web site of values that (should) match the information
on the voter’s paper receipt.
Systems without receipts operate as follows:
1. The voter uses a voting station such as a DRE to make ballot choices.
2. The voter verifies the ballot choices in an independent module connected to the voting
station. If the voter agrees, the independent module cryptographically protects and stores
the ballot choices (second record) and the voting terminal also stores the ballot choices.
3. Election authorities can check the integrity of DRE records using the voter-verified ballot
choices that have been cryptographically protected and stored in the independent module.
Our porposed changes in the definition of End to End IDV systems affect sections D.1 and D.5 of
Appendix D. | |
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