|

 
|
| | Name : | Danny Kleinman | Organization : | N/A | Post Date : | 9/30/2005 |
| Comment : | Here, I suggest, are some desirable criteria for such a voting system.
(5) No Vote-Splitting Risk. One reason the voters do not have as wide a choice as lies in the phenomenon known as “splitting” the vote, which is an artifact of our American voting system. The real choice of the American electorate in 2000 might be John McCain or Bill Bradley, but neither is on the ballot. It might be argued that both were rejected in the primaries and conventions of their parties, but that is irrelevant, for each might attract wide support from voters not in their parties. In most states, only voters who register in a particular party may vote for candidates of that party in the primaries: Democrats for McCain, Republicans for Bradley, and Independents (or voters registered in minor parties) have no say in the Republican and Democratic primaries, yet their votes might elect McCain or Bradley if either or both were on the November ballot. Under the present voting system, the Republican Party would be foolish to nominate both Bush and McCain for President, since the “split” Republican votes would guarantee victory for the lone Democratic candidate Gore. Likewise, the Democratic Party would be foolish to nominate both Gore and Bradley for President, since the “split” Democratic votes would guarantee victory for the lone Republican candidate Bush. McCain, whose political position is not far from Bush’s, and Bradley, whose political position is close to Gore’s, would be equally foolish to run as Independents, for they’d also split the vote of their parties. An optimal voting system would allow each party to nominate two or more candidates without diminishing the chance for a candidate of the party to win the election. | |
|
|