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| | Name : | Jordi Puiggali | Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting | Post Date : | 9/9/2005 |
| Comment : | Exhibit B – Direct voter-verifiability through Independent Electronic Modules
The search for voter-verifiability solutions
The use of electronic voting in elections has reached a widespread use in the United
States. During the November 2004 Presidential Elections, approximately one third of
the voters used Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting terminals to cast their votes.
These electronic voting terminals provide some real benefits to the voters, such as the
prevention of unintentional voting errors (i.e., undervoting and overvoting), or the
increased accessibility for people with disabilities (e.g., blind or visually impaired
voters).
Nonetheless, despite these advantages, DREs are generally perceived as insecure
systems that do not provide any assurance with regard to the correct treatment of the
votes that they record and store. Indeed, as DREs are designed today, the voter has to
place blind faith in the DRE inner workings and trust that the DRE will record (and
count) her vote as she really intended. Although all the voting equipment (including
DREs) currently in use in the United States is independently audited and certified, the
significant complexity of DREs (as a result of the many tasks that a DRE must perform)
makes the auditing process difficult and, therefore does not allow to dissipate all
possible doubts about their correct functioning.
Given the significant presence of DREs in polling places throughout the United States,
one can easily understand the nation-wide effort that is underway in the search for
solutions capable of providing DREs with enhanced auditability mechanisms and the
voter with means to verify the correct treatment of her vote. This vast effort has
resulted in numerous legislative initiatives at federal and state levels and in a number
of innovative technological solutions to provide voter-verifiability to current DRE
equipment. | |
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