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| | Name : | N/A | Organization : | N/A | Post Date : | 9/30/2005 |
| Comment : | Part three of three
Similarly, some voting systems are difficult to live audit efficiently, even though they may technically be live auditable. One example would be a paper-based optical scan system without unique identifiers. Live auditing the ballot scanning and interpretation component of such a system to a reasonable degree of confidence would involve the independent interpretation of a large number of ballots, and therefore make live auditing practically infeasible for this system. The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines should discourage the
use of voting systems with components that are practically infeasible to live audit.
Another requirement for live auditing is that the systems under audit
must not have any means of detecting that they are under audit. The system must be auditable without putting it into any "test modes" or other modes of operation that are not used during a live election.
Live auditing is not a new concept for election administrators. Many jurisdictions use teams of election judges, composed of citizens with
different party affiliations, at various points in the voting process,
including ballot box unsealing and questionable vote interpretation.
In these teams, each judge is live auditing the decisions of the other
judges. This basic philosophy - that decisions made by one observer
must be verified by at least one other independent observer - should
also be used to test the voting system equipment used during an election. The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines should promote the incorporation of peer-reviewed live audit techniques in voting system design and election official best practices. | |
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