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| | Name : | Stanley A. Klein | Organization : | N/A | Post Date : | 9/30/2005 |
| Comment : | * Voting systems have been clearly and repeatedly demonstrated to be seriously insecure and
vulnerable to malicious tampering. We need to view the fraudulent takeover of
government power by cybercriminal stealth just as seriously as we view the wrongful
takeover of government power by force and violence. In a 4year
election cycle, roughly
$2 Billion to $3 Billion is spent to influence the outcome of elections. If ruthless,
unscrupulous interests diverted just a single digit percentage of that money to developing
and executing technically sophisticated attacks on voting systems, the aggregate
expenditure could exceed a quarter billion dollars. This is not just an abstract possibility
some
individuals, reporters, and researchers have alleged that attacks at various levels of
sophistication have already affected results in recent Federal and state elections. Valid or
not, these allegations are within the envelope of technical/operational feasibility. The
VVSG is weak in the area of security. This is exacerbated by its failure to include the kind
of serious, intensive, mandatory testing for security vulnerability that, for almost 30 years,
has been required of other systems of critical national importance. This failure effectively
neutralizes and negates even its new requirements that might otherwise be improvements. | |
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