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Section CommentsGeneral CommentsGlossary Comments
 
Name :   Jordi Puiggali
Organization :   Scytl Secure Electronic Voting
Post Date :   9/9/2005

Section Comments
Section :  A1D
Page no. :  
Line no.:  
Comment :  [Volume I, Appendix D]
Comments on Section 1.2.2 End to End Cryptographic IDV Systems
The general description of End to End Cryptographic IDV systems included in Appendix D is based
on a specific implementation of these systems: the receipt-based systems. There are other
alternative implementations that use end to end cryptography to generate a second record without
issuing voting receipts. Some of these alternative implementations allow voters to verify that their
votes are cast as they intended in a secure and reliable environment independent from the voting
terminal. The votes are then cryptographically protected until they reach the Electoral Board.
These systems provide end to end security (i.e., from the voter to the Electoral Board) by cryptographic means without having to rely on the complex technological infrastructure and system
administrators sitting between the voters and the Electoral Board.
Since there are alternative implementations of End to End Cryptographic IDV systems that do not
use receipts, we suggest to include in the Guidelines two types of End to End Cryptographic IDV
systems: receipt-based systems and systems without receipts.