|

 
|
| | Name : | Jordi Puiggali | Organization : | Scytl Secure Electronic Voting | Post Date : | 9/9/2005 |
| Comment : | (Illustration not included here.0
Figure 2: Verification process performed by a voter
At the end of the election, the election authorities can retrieve, as usual, the votes from
the DRE. Additionally, they can now check the votes tabulated by the DRE against an
integrity record that is provided by the VM. This integrity record is generated by the VM,
based on every single voter-verified vote (for the crypto savvy, the integrity record is
calculated as a one-way accumulator that allows detecting any alteration of the votes
with the exception of changes in the ordering of the votes). Should the set of votes
retrieved from the DRE not match the integrity record from the VM, the election
authorities could retrieve the back-up votes from the VM (which are the
cryptographically-protected voter-verified votes) and implement a parallel recount
based on them.
1. The voter makes the selection of her voting options for all the races in the DRE.
2. The selected options are transferred from the DRE to the VM.
3. The voter verifies (via screen and/or audio) the selected options and confirms them.
4. The verified voting options are encrypted and digitally signed in the VM in order to
protect every single vote from possible attacks that can take place either in the DRE
or outside it.
5. The protected vote is stored in the VM and a positive verification message is sent to
the DRE where the vote is also stored. | |
|
|