Audit Selection Report for Thompson School District R2-J Director District E (4 Years)
Proportion of the total number of votes for this contest that were cast within this county: 0.4%
- Overall margin of victory: 14.391%
- Margin of victory in this county: 22.059%
- Number of audit units in this county: 53
- Number of audit units to audit (NEGEXP, 75% confidence, WPM < 20%): 0.0
See additional statistical information below...
The audit units are reported for selection in priority order, based on the thresholds below, and the "Sum of Square Roots" pseudorandom number generator using the random seed value 569985350872703 combined with the Batch sequence numbers.
Select the top 0 audit units.
Batch Seq | Threshold | Random | Priority | Type | Batches | Ballots | Contest Ballots | Diana D. Greer | Lori Hvizda Ward | Over | Sharon Olson | Under |
Totals | 4 | 7 | 0 | 22 | 35 | |||||||
000025 | 0.055090 | 0.025277 | 2.179435 | AB | p025_mb_562 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000272 | 0.055090 | 0.033268 | 1.655942 | AB | p272_mb_698 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000114 | 0.107146 | 0.093261 | 1.148881 | AB | p114_mb_695 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
000277 | 0.156333 | 0.195097 | 0.801308 | AB | p277_mb_653 | 150 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
000162 | 0.055090 | 0.079993 | 0.688688 | AB | p162_mb_655 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000275 | 0.055090 | 0.092784 | 0.593746 | AB | p275_mb_519 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000042 | 0.055090 | 0.112267 | 0.490706 | AB | p042_mb_631 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000244 | 0.055090 | 0.114911 | 0.479418 | AB | p244_mb_543 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000169 | 0.055090 | 0.131133 | 0.420110 | AB | p169_mb_642 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000179 | 0.055090 | 0.141037 | 0.390609 | AB | p179_mb_540 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000105 | 0.107146 | 0.314941 | 0.340209 | AB | p105_mb_536 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
000113 | 0.055090 | 0.167596 | 0.328710 | AB | p113_mb_694 | 150 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000092 | 0.055090 | 0.171830 | 0.320609 | AB | p092_mb_527 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000027 | 0.055090 | 0.204039 | 0.269998 | AB | p027_mb_532 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000064 | 0.055090 | 0.211245 | 0.260789 | AB | p064_mb_686 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000066 | 0.055090 | 0.218066 | 0.252631 | AB | p066_mb_691 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000069 | 0.156333 | 0.648126 | 0.241208 | AB | p069_mb_341 | 150 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000282 | 0.107146 | 0.469012 | 0.228450 | AB | p282_mb_488 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
000018 | 0.107146 | 0.527893 | 0.202968 | AB | p018_mb_530 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
000082 | 0.055090 | 0.291195 | 0.189187 | AB | p082_mb_535 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000223 | 0.107146 | 0.596394 | 0.179656 | AB | p223_mb_356 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
000009 | 0.055090 | 0.317568 | 0.173475 | AB | p009_mb_571 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000050 | 0.055090 | 0.326694 | 0.168629 | AB | p050_mb_579 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000346 | 0.156333 | 0.951514 | 0.164299 | AB | p346_mb_382 | 150 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000126 | 0.055090 | 0.383868 | 0.143513 | AB | p126_mb_318 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000088 | 0.107146 | 0.768779 | 0.139371 | AB | p088_mb_506 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
000266 | 0.055090 | 0.395883 | 0.139158 | AB | p266_mb_634 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000010 | 0.107146 | 0.774266 | 0.138383 | AB | p010_mb_572 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
000214 | 0.107146 | 0.788070 | 0.135959 | AB | p214_mb_305 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
000023 | 0.055090 | 0.418577 | 0.131613 | AB | p023_mb_564 | 150 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000383 | 0.107146 | 0.870264 | 0.123118 | AB | p383_mb_253 | 150 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
000185 | 0.055090 | 0.461370 | 0.119406 | AB | p185_mb_689 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000048 | 0.055090 | 0.480489 | 0.114654 | AB | p048_mb_546 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000186 | 0.055090 | 0.488840 | 0.112696 | AB | p186_mb_696 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000036 | 0.055090 | 0.490256 | 0.112370 | AB | p036_mb_557 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000176 | 0.055090 | 0.507949 | 0.108456 | AB | p176_mb_637 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000033 | 0.055090 | 0.552539 | 0.099704 | AB | p033_mb_554 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000083 | 0.055090 | 0.622839 | 0.088450 | AB | p083_mb_521 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000112 | 0.055090 | 0.684901 | 0.080435 | AB | p112_mb_693 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000074 | 0.055090 | 0.685019 | 0.080421 | AB | p074_mb_335 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000057 | 0.055090 | 0.705503 | 0.078087 | AB | p057_mb_662 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000108 | 0.055090 | 0.729251 | 0.075544 | AB | p108_mb_514 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000203 | 0.055090 | 0.732381 | 0.075221 | AB | p203_mb_313 | 131 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000389 | 0.055090 | 0.754972 | 0.072970 | AB | p389_mb_428 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000262 | 0.055090 | 0.774803 | 0.071102 | AB | p262_mb_664 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
000173 | 0.055090 | 0.815687 | 0.067538 | AB | p173_mb_645 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000081 | 0.055090 | 0.854479 | 0.064472 | AB | p081_mb_470 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000072 | 0.055090 | 0.855452 | 0.064399 | AB | p072_mb_338 | 74 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000213 | 0.055090 | 0.862405 | 0.063880 | AB | p213_mb_376 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000075 | 0.055090 | 0.914968 | 0.060210 | AB | p075_mb_334 | 118 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000148 | 0.055090 | 0.963496 | 0.057177 | AB | p148_mb_463 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
000059 | 0.055090 | 0.971916 | 0.056682 | AB | p059_mb_699 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
000320 | 0.055090 | 0.996435 | 0.055287 | AB | p320_mb_395 | 150 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Audit statistics
The "Number of audit units to audit" is based on the NEGEXP method, which is very efficient and requires selecting larger audit units with higher probability than smaller ones. The numbers given here are based on a confidence level of 75%. I.e. they are designed so the audit will either 1) find a discrepancy and call for an escalation or full hand recount, or 2) reduce the risk of confirming an incorrect outcome to (100 - 75)%, even if the tally system has been manipulated. A maximum "within-precinct-miscount" of 20% is assumed. See On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes, by Javed A. Aslam, Raluca A. Popa and Ronald L. Rivest
Contest: Thompson School District R2-J Director District E (4 Years) Number of precincts: 53 Total number of votes cast: 68 Average number of votes/precinct: 1.28301886792 Median number of votes/precinct: 1 Maximum number of votes/precinct: 3 Minimum number of votes/precinct: 1 Ratio of max/min: 3.0 margin = 14.3908 percent, 9.785744 votes s = 0.2 (maximum within-precinct-miscount) alpha = 0.25 (confidence is 1 - alpha: 0.75 ) Rule of Thumb says: 3.85327948723 precincts. expected workload = 8.98113207547 votes counted. APR says: b = 19.06781 precincts needed to hold corruption u = 3 precincts to audit expected workload = 3.84905660377 votes confidence level to find one of b = 0.746129745798 bmin = 11 confidence level to find one of bmin = 0.509946213609 SAFE says: bmin = 11 Number of precincts to audit = u = 6 Confidence level achieved = 0.771499920723 expected workload = 7.69811320755 Negexp says: w = 7.0589221701 largest probability = 0.156333179222 smallest probability = 0.0550902652297 expected number of precincts audited = 3.69201075031 expected workload = 5.59432016387 votes counted PPEBWR says: t = 4 largest total probability = 0.165132075691 smallest total probability = 0.0575386261389 expected number of precincts audited = 3.86749982789 expected workload = 5.87131221115 votes counted. max difference from negexp = 0.00879889646864